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International trade liberalisation often implies increased potentials for export 
production. For investing in increasing capacity in agriculture, farmers need to 
have credit access. However, farmers in many countries are credit constrained, 
e.g. due to collateral reasons, which is the case in Central Europe and East 
Africa, among others.  A model illustrates the additional producer gains from 
having access to credit; the gains are composed of a price effect, an investment 
effect, and a social capital externality. 
 
Improvement of agricultural credit can be achieved by relying on existing 
social structures, such as farmers’ social capital. This approach tackles the 
collateral issue and can furthermore entail benefits external to the investment 
decision. The paper concludes that these externalities need to be addressed 
when designing optimal agricultural credit institutions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Historically, agriculture has been the backbone of all economies and still holds 
a special place, both economically as well as culturally, relative to other sectors 
of the economy. It has a distinct biological character, making production 
unpredictable and to some extent uncontrollable. In comparison to other 
markets demand for agricultural produce tends to be very inelastic, and as 
income increases the expenditure proportion spent on food decreases. Thus, 
especially in the most developed countries, with time the importance of 
agriculture has decreased in comparison to other sectors.  
 
However, in relation to international t rade liberalisation, agriculture still 
represents an important issue. Some of the largest economic gains could arise 
from reducing agricultural trade barriers. To be able to extract these gains 
countries will have to overcome a number of constraints, including an 
insufficient administrative, infrastructural, and supply capacity, as well as a 
lack of political will. 
 
Regarding the issue of enhancing agricultural supply capacity, researchers 
often point to a lacking access to credit as an important constraint (see for 
example Mathijs and Swinnen, 1999). In an African context, Mosley (1999) 
points out that the problem of credit is crucial and that distinction must be 
made between individual credit markets; i.e. industrial versus agricultural 
credit markets. This is also the case of the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC), as documented by Chloupkova (1996). 
 
All around the world, there are numerous cases of discrimination against rural 
credit, based on the lack of suitable collateral, high transaction costs for the 
credit institution and sometimes also due to various government interventions 
in the market.
1 One of these effects might lead to a reduction of farming 
incentives leading to entrepreneurial-minded farmers wanting to seek 
opportunities elsewhere, thereby reducing the total efficiency in agriculture. 
Nevertheless, rural structures can make it difficult to liquidate farm properties 
and find an alternative employment, which could be an additional constraint 
that is biased against the average farmer. 
                                                 
1 In the 1970s, the ‘first wave of micro-credit’ proved that good intentions of interventions had adverse 
effects. Subsidised interest rates had costly macroeconomic consequences, local power elites captured 
the credit, and debt forgiveness undermined the financial viability of the institutions (Yaron  and 
McDonald, 1997). Similarly, highly subsidised agricultural credit schemes in Poland and Romania 
have not solved the issue of access to credit (Swinnen et al; 2001).   3 
 
The objective of this paper is to conceptualise the importance of agricultural 
credit markets in seizing the full potential of increased market access by 
improving the investment efficiency in the agricultural sector, and thus 
furthering regional and social development by making it more attractive to stay 
in these areas. A simple model illustrates the theoretical effects of credit 
constraints. As a consequence of the endemic lack of relevant data for 
econometric analysis, two regional cases explain and document in details the 
effects of the model.  The selected cases are focused on Central Europe (the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) and East Africa (Uganda, Tanzania and 
Kenya).  
 
With the EU Association Agreements and the future accession, on the agenda, 
Central Europe will gain improved access to EU markets in the very near 
future. The possibilities arising from the EU enlargement can only be captured 
in full if the shortcomings of the Central European agricultural credit markets 
are solved.  
 
In contrast to for example the Czech Republic, which is historically a very 
industrialised country, East Africa is heavily dependent on its agricultural 
sector; a feature shared with most Least Developed Countries (LDC). However, 
a formal East African agricultural credit market hardly exists, making 
agricultural investments exceedingly difficult. With the ‘Everything But Arms’ 
(EBA) initiative Uganda and Tanzania has gained full access to the EU 
markets, but similarly to Central Europe, the full export potential will not be 
utilised unless the access to agricultural credit is improved.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Before analysing the cases, section 2 
presents the model framework used for analysing the importance of having 
access to credit. The following section 3 describes the credit markets in the two 
selected regions. Section 4 addresses the potentials of the EU trade agreements. 
Section 5 describes how to avoid credit constraints and thereby how to benefit 
from the trade agreements. The last two sections 6 and 7 summarise the paper 




2.  Model framework 
   4 
2.a.  Overall framework 
 
The model used for illustrating the importance of credit is based on the 
relations between production, profitability and credit, influenced by numerous 
factors. These relations are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The effective farm level production 
The figure illustrates that improved productivity can increase profitability 
through increased efficiency. Increased efficiency could  be achieved via 
investing in any of the six components depicted above (investment effect), 
namely: availability of basic inputs, productivity of labour, physical capital, 
technology, management and transport and communication means. Moreover, 
the synergy of all these components could dynamically increase this effect.   5 
 
The prerequisite for investment is the availability of financial capital, either 
from retained farm-earnings or from having access to various sources of credit. 
Nevertheless, with obtaining credit through formal or semiformal institutions, 
some additional positive effects external to the investment decision may take 
place, in particular effects related to social capital accumulation (see box no. 
1). The size of the effects depends on the set-up and institutional design of the 
credit disbursement. For example, such effects can work through increasing 
farmers’ social capital, which augments human capital, and thus induce 
learning spill-overs, as discussed in section 5.  
 






The central production-credit cycle depicted in figure 2, which is the essence of 
figure 1, closes with profits generating financial means that can be reinvested 
in the production and/or facilitate increased credit access, via signalling the 
accountability and credibility of the farmer to the credit institutions. 
 











As figure 1 illustrates, the profitability of the optimal production is affected, 
either positively or negatively, by domestic or international policies, and by 
policies reducing trade barriers in particular. For example, certain policies 
could enable farmers to achieve economies of scale. In order to benefit from 





Social capital is usually defined as “features of social organisations, such as 
trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating co-ordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167).     6 
functioning, thus enabling farmers to react optimally to changing factors in the 
economic environment. 
 
2.b.  The model 
 
For reasons of simplicity, the analysis following from figure 3 below is only 
partial as it ignores the effect of the domestic market. Thus the analysis 
assumes that the productions for international and domestic market are separate 
matters; cross effects are not incorporated. 
 








   
 







Figure 3 illustrates a situation where the agricultural sector initially produces 
the quantity qo at the producer price po = pEU / (1+t); where pEU is the price in 
the internal EU market, and  t is the applied tariff level.
2 After a trade 
liberalisation, i.e. a removal (or reduction) of trade custom duties, the producer 
price on internationally traded agricultural commodities increases to p1 = pEU.  
 
The shaded area depicted by symbol A represents direct producer gains from 
trade liberalisation implying a producer price increase. Area B represents the 
gain from a production expansion leading to a trade expansion. It is important 
to note that this gain can be achieved only through investing in production 
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capacity. These potential investment gains imply an imperative need of credit. 
The area depicted by symbol C, represents the additional potential externalities, 
i.e. the positive spill-overs that can be achieved by certain institutional set-up, 
discussed in more details below, in section 5b. 
 
The total gain (A + B + C) is divided among producers, consumers and trade 
agents.
3 In the following, only producers’ gains are considered. 
 
In mathematical terms, the model consists of a standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function Y, being part of profit function, which is:  
 
wL rK H L K p wL rK pY - - = - - = P
- b a a J
1  
 
where: p = producer price 
  J = technology coefficient 
  K = composite capital 
  L = labour 
  H = human capital 
  r =  interest rate 
  w = wages  
 
Trade liberalisation normally implies the removal of trade barriers and thus 
increased market access, i.e. the price increases from po to p1. Over two periods 
where the loan is repaid, the gains achieved through this price increase are:  
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In other words, DA  represents the gains of receiving higher producer prices. 
With access to credit the farmer will be able to invest in increased capacity and 
thus extract the full gain of liberalisation. The gains from having access to 
credit are therefore: 
 
                                                 
3 The relative share of the gains for trade agents depends on their relative bargaining strength. The 
remaining gain is divided between producers and consumers, with the consumer share increasing and 


































b a a J  
 
As figure 3 illustrates, these gains are unambiguously positive. 
 
On the other hand, the benefits arising from externalities connected to social 
capital may not always be positive, as can be seen from augmenting the 
production function slightly.  If, for example, there are learning spill-overs 
associated with the credit disbursement process, the production function Y 
becomes: 
 
( ) ( )




where: w = social capital augmenting human capital (learning spill-over) 
 t = transaction cost associated with acquiring social capital (networking) 
 
These learning spill-overs could for example arise when clients attend meetings 
at the credit institution and talk while waiting (the time t), thereby making new 
acquaintances
4. The acquaintances might bring new knowledge or methods, 
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The equation above shows the important condition that gains from the 
externality are positive only if the transaction costs are relatively small in 
comparison to labour productivity.  
 
In summary the model illustrates three effects of increased market access: DA, 
the immediate gain from producers receiving higher prices; DB, the additional 
gain of being able to invest in an increased supply capacity; and DC, a potential 
effect external to the investment decision. The two latter effects are discussed 
in section 5. 
 
                                                 
4 Such learning spill-overs are similar to the effects of social capital as documented by Coleman (1988) 
in the article that started the modern social capital research.   9 
In real life situations, it must not be forgotten that as farmers gain access to 
new markets, their comparative advantages could change, implying that the 
optimal production structure will shift as well.
5 It should be stressed that this 
one-sector model captures only one aspect of the problem, irrespective of other 
influences coming from within and/or outside of the sector. 
 
3.  Description of credit markets 
 
The model described above illustrates the importance of well-functioning 
agricultural credit market. However, in the real world, for example in the 
transition countries, credit markets do not function well, and there are examples 
of developing countries where formal agricultural credit markets are entirely 
missing. The credit markets in Central Europe are selected in order to represent 
the transitional economies, which are front-runners for the EU enlargement. 
East Africa, which is currently economically prospering, but lacking formal 
agricultural credit markets, is given as an example from the developing 
countries. 
 
Table 1. Selected countries economic profiles 











Denmark  2.6  4  57.3  36.2  25 353 
Czech Republic  3.3  5  67.8  60.4  13 026 
Hungary  6.3  10  40.2  49.6  10 808 
Poland  6.3  26  36.1  26.6  8 040 
Kenya  25.7  75-80  43.8  25.8  1 023  
Uganda  43.7  82  13.2  11.6  1 114 
Tanzania  45.4  80  17.6  13.9  489 
 
Note:  Indicators are averages for 1997-1999. Financial depth is M2 pr GDP %. 
Source: World development indicators (2001), CIA World Factbook (2001) and European 
Commission (2001). 
 
3.a.  Agricultural credit in Central Europe 
 
In the last decade of transition from centrally planned to market economy, the 
Central European agricultural sector underwent significant changes. In the 
Czech Republic, Hungary as well as other CEEC, most agriculture was 
collectivised by the communist regime. Later, in the process of transition, most 
                                                 
5 Lukas (1999) suggests that this could imply a shift from low-value added to high value-added 
production.   10 
farmland was restituted. However, a substantial part of the restituted farmland 
has been leased back to the transformed cooperative farms. On the other hand, 
Poland (as well as Slovenia) maintained private ownership of 80 % of the land 
and farm assets, thereby maintaining small and inefficient farms throughout the 
communist time (European Commission, 1998). Either way, this coexistence of 
relatively small private farms and large-scale transformed cooperative and state 
farming is typical of the dualistic character of agriculture in the CEEC.
6 
 
The process of transition to market economies, complemented by the removal 
of state subsidies, lead to lowered profitability. Furthermore, the process of 
transition made much of the existing agricultural capital and infrastructure unfit 
for the emerging agricultural structure, necessitating additional investment in 
restructuring production. However, reformed credit institutions were reluctant 
to finance agricultural investments. This lack of investments further lowered 
profitability, putting a ‘brake’ on the production-credit circle (cf. figure 2).  
 
The lack of investment in agriculture is closely related to the land market, 
which is not well functioning in the CEEC (Swinnen et al; 2001)
7. Since land 
prices are low (due to the lowered profitability in agriculture), the demand for 
land is limited, and thus banks are reluctant to accept land as a collateral 
(Lukas, 1999). In addition, some CEEC have introduced measures, which 
distort land m arkets; for example Hungary has linked agricultural land 
purchase with the requirement of professional qualification and obligation of 
cultivation (CIVITAS, 2001). 
 
As a response to these problems, CEEC states have launched various measures 
to tackle lack of credit. For example, the Czech Republic has employed the 
State Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry – SGFFF (in Czech: Podpurny 
a garancni rolnicky a lesnicky fond) to provide collateral guarantees and 
interest rate subsidies through various programmes. Other CEEC have applied 
similar measures. These programmes have been successful in treating 
symptoms, but neglected the main source of the problem, that land cannot be 
used as collateral.
8 This problem has to be solved in order to provide the much-
needed investments. 
 
                                                 
6 In other words, contrary to the EU, the distribution of farm sizes in the CEEC is bi-polar. 
7 In addition, in some CEECs, land markets are not well-developed. 
8 For example the Czech SGFFF has an impressive 96.5% repayment rate (in interview with SGFFF, 
October 2001). However, the underlying problem of farmers’ high indebtedness has not been 
addressed (Swinnen et al; 2001).   11 
3.b.  Agricultural credit in East Africa 
 
The Czech Republic might be moving away from solving the problems in 
agricultural credit market by treating symptoms, while ignoring the causes. 
However, this is only a minor problem in comparison t o the situation in 
developing countries. As Yaron and Benjamin (1997, p. 40) document, the 
endemic failure of agricultural credit schemes in developing countries was 
partly a consequence of “biased sectoral policies, excessive government 
intervention, and legal and regulatory barriers”.   
 
In comparison to other African countries, East African semiformal financial 
markets are relatively developed. Nevertheless, the East African rural financial 
markets exemplify the problems typical to developing countries. Ugandan and 
Tanzanian financial markets are shallow, as can be seen from table 1 above, 
implying that the general access to credit is restricted.
9 Moreover, the limited 
existing credit sources are usually allocated to urban purposes, which means 
that the formal type of agricultural credit is virtually nonexistent for at least ¾ 
of the rural households.  
 
A number of high-profile micro-finance organisations (MFOs) exist in these 
countries and provide both urban and rural financial services.
10 In addition two 
formal banks have entered the Ugandan micro-financial market. Still, there is a 
long way to go before east Africa can claim to have well-functioning 
agricultural credit markets. Findings lead to the conclusion that even micro-
finance schemes discriminate against farmers. A rational explanation is that 
transaction costs in reaching farmers are higher, in comparison with clients in 
densely populated urban areas.
11 For example, only one semiformal 
organisation in Uganda, FOCCAS, focuses entirely on agricultural credit. In 
addition, the Centenary Rural Development Bank serves the non-poor rural 
population, thus excluding most farmers.
12 Moreover, nationwide, there is less 
than one bank branch per 120 000 of inhabitants, implying that less than 20 % 
                                                 
9 Tanzania and Uganda are currently classified as least developed countries (LDC) by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As Table 1 illustrates Kenya is somewhat more developed, 
all three countries are members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States. 
10 The concept of Micro-finance covers a range of institutional set-ups, providing financial services to 
small scale low-income enterprises, often through  group-based joint liability schemes. 
11 This is based on the fact that 82% of the Ugandan population works in agriculture, while only 46% 
of the micro-finance clients are farm based, implying that even these subsidised, high profile MFOs 
discriminate against agriculture. 
12 The average loan size at the CRDB is 877 US$ - about 80 % of yearly GDP per capita, indicating 
that the poor segment of the population including most farmers, is not served by the bank.   12 
of micro-entrepreneurs, including the vast majority of farmers, have access to 
credit (Jacobson, 1999, p. 15). This described lack of agricultural credit thus 
pertains to the supply side, and is typical of developing countries in East 
Africa.  
 
In the other East African countries, agricultural credit markets are very thin. 
From of a potential of 4 million informal Tanzanian enterprises, of which a 
substantial part without doubt are based in agriculture, semiformal credit 
institutions currently cover only about 40,000, or 1 % of the prospective market 
(Hulme, 1999). The coverage in Kenya is higher, but unsatisfactory in relation 
to the total demand, pointing to a large agricultural population without 
sufficient access to credit. This population is therefore excluded from any 
beneficial effects from investing in farm production. 
 
Generally speaking, as the worldwide inventory by Paxton (1999) suggests, 
developing countries have significant demands to be met. Currently, the effect 




4.  The effects of EU trade agreements on agriculture 
 
Assuming that the agricultural sectors receive a positive exogenous demand 
shock, for example through an increased market access provided for by various 
trade liberalising agreements, the sectors will be able to react optimally, and 
thus benefit from the increased export opportunities, provided that efficient 
agricultural credit markets are in place. The EU enlargement and the Cotonou 
Agreement are examples of such potentially beneficial demand shocks.  
 
However the good will of the European Union’s trade agreements might not be 
exploited optimally, due to ill-functioning credit markets in for example 
Central Europe and East Africa. The next subsections will describe the 
potential of the given EU trade agreements for agricultural sectors. 
 
4.a.  EU enlargement and the Association Agreements 
 
                                                 
13 The common examples of the success of micro-finance are the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh that 
currently serves more than 2 millions women; Bank Rakyat in Indonesia that serves 16.2 million 
clients; and Bolivian micro-finance, consisting of a number of schemes, which currently serve more 
than 100,000 clients (Bjørnskov, 2000).    13 
The association agreements between Central Europe and the EU serve as a 
mechanism for gradually opening domestic markets to sensitive products, 
including agricultural and food products through the introduction of tariff rate 
quotas (OECD, 1995).
14 This liberalisation serves as one of the instruments in 
the process of EU enlargement.  
 
The EU accession will allow Central Europe, as well as the EU countries, to 
trade freely, thus enabling all the partners to benefit from their comparative 
advantages. For example, in Czech agriculture these advantages include barley, 
malt and hops (OECD, 1995, p. 170). Accession should improve the 
agricultural trade balance for the Czech Republic, which has been and still is 
negative, figure for 1999 is – 472 millions US$ (for some illustrative examples, 
see table 1. in the appendix). 
 
Nevertheless, the EU accession entails an increased agricultural export 
potential for Central Europe as well as for other CEEC.
15 There are numerous 
examples of new export opportunities related to the increases in producer 
prices. OECD (1995) identifies the production of beef and pork as important 
Czech and Polish exports under the EU association agreements. For example, 
Mahé (1996) suggests that the price of bovine meat in the Czech Republic will 
increase by the year 2002 by 16-76%. Since the EU market price for bovine 
meat is high (relative to world market prices), and it is an important export 
commodity for the Czech Republic (OECD, 1995), this will create increased 
export opportunities for Czech beef producers due to a 54% increase in real 
export prices.
16 The European Commission (1998) estimates that there will be a 
slight export potential in the year 2003, i.e. before the EU accession.
17 It is 
important to note that there is a direct link between the production of beef and 
milk (European Commission, 2001). 
 
Nevertheless the estimates of future prices imply that there will also be real 
export price decreases, for example a 25% decrease of real export price of pork 
(calculation based on Mahé, 1996). Such percentage changes correspond to dp 
                                                 
14 The main characteristic of trade under the planned economies 1949-91 was the existence, as in other 
former CMEA countries, of two foreign trade areas, the ‘rouble zone’, and the ‘dollar zone’, which 
severely limited trade with Western Europe (OECD, 1995). 
15 Some researchers have argued that the liberalisation efforts contained in the Association 
Agreements are biased against products in which the CEEC have comparative advantages. 
16 Based on calculations using data from UNCTAD (2001) the potential price increase is 32%, 
implying an approximate gain of 600 000 US$. 
17 The export surplus projection of the European Commission (1998, p. 49) is 12 000 tonnes in the year 
2003.   14 
in the model in section 2. Based on available data imputed into the simplified 
model in section 2, a guesstimate of the potential gains in the beef sector 
represented by DA in the model is in the vicinity of 1.2 million US$ for the 
Czech Republic. The potential loss due the lowered prices on pork could be 
more than 240 000 US$. These numbers only serve to demonstrate the 
potentials of trade liberalisation. In general, new trading opportunities in the 
accession countries could potentially bring in total annual gains of 1-3% of 
GDP (Frandsen and Jensen, 2000). Nevertheless d ue to the relative 
unimportance of the Czech agricultural sector, these gains will probably be 
significantly smaller for the Czech Republic than for Hungary and Poland.  
 
4.b.  EBA, Cotonou and regional agreements  
 
During the last two years, the EU has launched two new development and 
trading initiatives.  
 
One is the Cotonou agreement with the ACP group, which replaces the former 
Lomé conventions.
18 The Cotonou agreement is built on three pillars: political 
cooperation, development aid and trade.
19 The intentions of the trade pillar are 
to reduce tariff barriers under the aegis of regional agreements. One of the 
candidates for forming Regional Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU 
is East African Cooperation (EAC). The agreement with EAC, a formal 
regional association comprised of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, is expected to 
reduce tariff rates on a number of agricultural EU imports that are important to 
East Africa, thereby increasing the access to EU markets.  
 
The second is the unilateral EBA initiative, which removes tariffs on all non-
weapon commodities exported to the EU by LDC.
20 Apart from the potential 
offered by the Cotonou agreement, the EBA dramatically increases the LDC 
access to EU markets, thereby increasing the export potentials of Uganda and 
Tanzania. For example, the DA gains for the Ugandan beef production are in 
the vicinity of 100 000 US$ 
 
                                                 
18 ACP is an abbreviation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, which in 1975 formed 
an official association with the purpose of gaining bargaining strength in various international 
negotiations. 
19 The Cotonou agreement is evaluated in more detail by Bjørnskov and Krivonos (2001). 
20 The EBA provides for a transition period in the case of sugar, bananas and rice.   15 
As is the case in the CEEC, extracting the full potential of Cotonou and the 
EBA requires investments, which will be the content of the following section.  
 
5.  Avoiding constraints and benefiting from given trade agreements 
 
The model showed how the effects leading to producer gains could be divided 
into three components. Guesses on the magnitude of DA were provided above; 
the next section documents the gains from DB and DC. 
 
5.a.  Investment effects 
 
Stevens and Kennan (2001), examining the future impacts accruable to the 
EBA initiative, stress that supply capacity in particular is a constraint to 
extracting the full potential of trade opportunities.  The benefits of investing in 
supply capacity correspond to the gains denoted as ?B in the model
21. 
 
As shown in figure 3 in section 2, the potential supply effect depicted by area B 
can only be captured by investing in production capacity or employing any 
excess capacity that farmers might posses at present. Khandker and Faruqee 
(2001) provide a striking example of Pakistani agricultural credit markets. The 
study documents the very severe constraints in the Pakistani agricultural credit 
market. In 1985, only 10 % o f rural households borrowed from formal 
institutions, and a negligible share of the households borrowed from 
semiformal institutions. By 1995, these percentages had decreased even more 
(op.cit., p.5). 
 
There is no reason to believe that Pakistani credit markets are functioning 
worse than agricultural credit markets in East Africa. On the contrary, South 
Asian credit markets are often found to be better functioning than their African 
counterparts.  
 
The study by Khandker and Faruqee (2001) provides an estimate of the impact 
on agricultural households’ income from borrowing at the Agricultural 
Development Bank of Pakistan. Marginal returns to agricultural production 
were estimated at 69 %, which translates into a 6 % marginal return to credit on 
                                                 
21 Due to the lack of estimates on product specific supply elasticities, DB can not be calculated with any 
accuracy. However, relying on estimates of supply elasticity of total agricultural sectors, Central 
European supply responses, and hence DB gains,  in general will  be approximately 3-5 times larger 
than East African responses (in interview with Hans G. Jensen, SJFI, October 2001).    16 
agricultural income. Moreover, the results indicate that poor households benefit 
much more than richer households.  
 
A study sponsored by USAID estimated the impact of Ugandan credit schemes. 
The USAID findings demonstrate, that the impact of having access to credit 
can be significantly positive for clients (Barnes et al., 1999).
22 
 
Deininger and Olinto (2000) undertook a similar quantitative study in Zambia. 
The conclusion of the study suggests that apart from the quite substantial 
effects of investing in production (livestock, fertilizer, etc.) comparable to the 
study from Pakistan, there is an additional benefit of having access to credit, 
corresponding to DC in the model of section 2.  
 
5.b.  Externalities and institutional design 
 
The findings of Deininger and Olinto (2000) in particular suggest that there can 
be significant external effects of having access to credit. All other things being 
equal, this additional benefit works ‘magic’ on total factor productivity. The 
effect of increased productivity is not explained b y a standard economic 
investment framework, and could perhaps be attributed to various 
psychological and social effects.  This “supervision” effect mentioned by 
Deininger and Olinto (2000) could for example be attained through an 
increased responsibility level and by signalling a level of trustworthiness. This 
signal and the knowledge of increased responsibility will be spread in the 
community, i.e. the farmers’ social network, through a shared ‘social 
language’. In other words, the external effect might work through increasing 
social capital, at the individual as well as the community level.  
 
Figure 4 shows the potential gains (positive external spill-over) depicted by DC 
in the model. The magnitude of these potential gains, and whether they will 
take place or not, depends on the design of credit institutions. In an entirely 
informal institutional framework - the act of borrowing from friends and family 
- credit depends on farmers’ social capital, to the extent that lenders must trust 
borrowers. Thus, the s ocial capital relied upon consists of  bonding social 
capital, i.e. trust in the network nucleus formed by families and friends 
(Woolcock, 1999). 
                                                 
22 The study is, however, methodologically flawed, not correcting for self-selection and a range of 
other client characteristics, as pointed out by Bjørnskov (2000). Results should therefore be interpreted 
with some caution.   17 
 
At the other end of the formality scale, formal banks also seem to rely on and 
create social capital (Deininger and Olinto, 2000). However, this social capital 
is of a more institutional character, being regulated more by rules than norms. 
As this capital is partially separated from clients’ networks, it should perhaps 
be denoted as institutional capital.  
 
Figure 4. Externalities 
 
Source: Based on suggestions in Bjørnskov (2000).  
 
The largest externalities probably arise in connection with borrowing at 
semiformal institutions. These institutions, depicted in the middle of the 
formality scale, usually rely on forming groups with joint liability and 
responsibilities, instead of relying on formal rules. These groups receive access 
to credit at the semiformal organisation. The credit is thereafter disbursed 
among group members. Repayment thus depends on trust and norms within the 
group, i.e. the social capital of the group. 
 
In general, MFO and village banks rely relatively more on social norms, 





   18 
structures rely on and create bridging social capital, i.e. trust and networks of 
more distant friends and acquaintances. The externalities arising from 
semiformal institutions are larger than in either formal or informal institutions, 
because they create relatively more social capital by expanding clients’ 
networks (Larance, 1998).  
 
The total magnitude of these externalities associated with having social capital 
might be greater than the simple sum of its various subcomponents (cf. figure 
3). This is due to potential cross-effects between single components creating a 
synergy effect. Mathematically speaking, the effects of social capital can be 
perceived as: c = c1 + c2 + c3 + f (c1, c2, c3). These effects lead to the additional 
producer gain depicted by area C. 
 
The beneficial effect of social capital  can for example include impacts of 
learning spill-overs (Kilpatrick and Falk, 1999), an increased capacity 
utilisation for example from sharing machinery (Weijland, 1999), and 
improved common pool resource management (Anderson, Locker and Nugent, 




In other words the external effects depend on the accumulation of social capital 
attributable to farmers’ participation in the credit institutions, be it of formal or 
semiformal character. As is evident in the model, it must not be forgotten that 
even these positive benefits comes with some transaction costs, mainly the time 
spent outside productive activity.  Researchers have recently  criticised many 
micro-finance institutions for not being sufficiently aware of this problem. An 
awareness of the importance of minimising transaction costs is often seen as 
the key to the success of Latin American programmes (Bhatt and Tang, 1998). 
Therefore, at the end of the day it must be considered where best to invest 
farmers’ time. 
 
6.  Suggestions 
 
The simple model and research findings point to the imperative need for 
tailoring the institutional design respective to its social and economic 
environment. In many countries, agricultural profitability is lowered due to 
constraints in the agricultural credit market. These constraints call for 
                                                 
23 Note that Lopez (1998) documents the importance of common pool resource management in 
developing agriculture.   19 
improving the agricultural credit institutions. By providing farmers with 
sufficient credit, efficient investment decisions can be taken, thus improving 
agricultural profitability. If farmers gain sufficient access to credit, there will 
be no use for state interventions, and in particular not for distortionary interest 
rate subsidies that work only as a ‘pain killer’.
24 Nevertheless, the use of 
collateral subsidies may be necessary in a transition period, as they function as 
a ‘bandage on a wound’ while the proper institutions are being set up. 
 
For solving the credit issue in developing countries, e.g. East Africa, the 
authors suggest that the formation and use of micro-finance institutions should 
be encouraged, providing access to both savings and credit facilities. The 
institutions do not need to be semiformal, but can be a part of an already 
existing formal bank structure; a top-down approach. However, the success of 
the Kenyan Rural Enterprise Programme has shown that MFOs can also evolve 
into formal bank structures, which illustrates the feasibility of bottom-up 
development in the financial sectors (Charitoneko et al, 1998). 
 
As Bjørnskov (2000) points out, governments and/or international development 
institutions should probably subsidise the education and training components of 
these institutions, but must avoid directly subsidising the actual financial 
component of the institutions. The financial component s hould focus on 
achieving financial sustainability in the medium to long term, while minimising 
transaction costs for both borrowers and lenders. Research findings suggest that 
social capital can be accumulated from participation in both components, 
leading to a virtuous circle of benefiting economically and thus gaining further 
access to credit (Grootaert, 2001). There are however additional benefits to 
social capital, which governments should take into account when setting up the 
institutions. 
 
Apart from  improving the access to credit, the institutional design in 
developing countries should focus relatively more on the external social capital 
effects, in comparison to Central European countries, where other institutional 
means for education and the distribution of learning are in place.  
 
                                                 
24 For example, the Malawi Mudzi Fund had a sufficient loan recovery for some year, but due to one 
instant of failed harvest, repayment rates dropped dramatically. They did not recover the following 
years, and the Fund therefore collapsed, demonstrating that simply subsidising ordinary credit 
disbursement can be harmful (Hulme and Mosley, 1996).    20 
For the Central European countries, standard micro-finance solutions as known 
from the developing countries probably have too high opportunity costs and are 
not fitting the current agricultural structures. However, possible solutions 
building upon the insights gained from MFOs could be utilised. In particular, a 
positive feature that can be borrowed from the MFOs is the use of the existing 
social structures, including the social capital of rural communities. For 
example, if a group of five farmers join together in order to purchase a shared 
investment item, and aim at obtaining credit with joint liability, their success 
will depend on both the self-selection of members of the group (for the 
members to trust each other) and having the legal provisions for joint liability 
lending operations.
25 Farmers joining resources for buying machinery, for 
example harvester, can use their social capital both for obtaining credit and 
sharing the harvester, as well as perhaps obtaining additional information and 
learning from each other.  
 
Herewith, the authors are not advocating a complete supplement of the 
educational infrastructure nor the social fabric. Nevertheless, the external 
benefits of credit disbursement, such as learning spill-overs and the creation of 
horizontal social networks (e.g. trusting rural micro-communities, the initial 
pre-fabric of democracy) are present and should not be completely ignored. In 
terms of the model, the access to credit as such enables farmers to extract gains 
DB. However, an optimal institutional design will also take at least some of the 
DC, the gains from external effects, into account. The issue is relatively more 
important to East Africa than to Central Europe, where formal educational and 
institutional structures are fairly developed, but the importance of accounting 




Agricultural sectors have to be able to invest in necessary changes of 
production structures and capacity, in order to reap the gains from increased 
international market access. For these investment purposes, farmers need to 
have access to credit. Nevertheless, the access to credit is a real bottleneck in 
both Central European and East African, as well as a whole range of other 
countries. Formal banks in these countries are usually reluctant to lend to 
                                                 
25 This underlying idea of cooperation is known in many CEEC from the past, however, not always with 
a positive connotation. Under the communist regime, there was so-called ‘cooperation’ in collective 
farms, and  ‘machinery circles’ in the case of Poland. Nevertheless this was not true cooperation, since 
the farmers did not self-select, and were forced into the cooperation.    21 
farmers, often due to the fact that farmers’ assets are not accepted as sufficient 
collateral, because markets for such assets are thin. In addition, enforcing 
collateral rights in developing countries is often impossible. 
 
In Central Europe, various state programmes are addressing the symptoms by 
subsidising interest rates and providing collateral guarantees, rather than 
addressing the causes.  Although successful, this approach only postpones a 
real solution of the collateral issue. In addition, the experiences of several 
developing countries show that ‘just’ subsidising interest rates for agricultural 
credit can be both expensive and socially distorting.  
 
Based on the presented model and empirical findings, this paper argues that the 
cause of the problem can be alleviated by tapping into existing social 
structures, as for example by relying on joint liability to supplement the 
traditional collateral. In an  East African context, this can be achieved by 
encouraging the provision of traditional micro-finance. Some of the lessons 
learned from MFOs, such as farmers’ ability to share collateral and 
responsibility, can be applied in Central Europe. Moreover, employing this 
social capital often creates additional social and economic benefits external to 
the original investment decisions.  
 
The increased efficiency and profitability in the agricultural sector derived 
from improved financial institutions can have direct benefits on the social 
structure of rural areas. These benefits may imply that farmers and farm 
workers do not leave rural and marginal areas to seek alternative employment 
opportunities in overcrowded urban areas, thereby supporting a sustainable 
rural and social development.    22 
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Appendixes 
 
Table A. Imports and Exports between the Czech Republic and the EU 
  Exports to EU  Imports from the EU 












Bovine meat  2.282  0.24  3 568  2.418  65.39  - 136 
Swine meat  975  0.85  2 419  15 776  95.17  - 13 357 
Milk powder  15 043  14.72  1 257  526  47.43  14 517 
Sugar  2 910  0.23  -  3 655  27.47  - 745 
Hops  8 790  36.00  4 289  1 304  44.83  7 486 
Wheat  250  0.09  -  97  1.26  153 
Barley  1 760  21.82  105  0  0  1 760 
Fruit  18 924  0.23  -  85 176  41.10  - 66 252 
Agriculture 
in total 
382 769  0.61  -  854 420  48.71  -471 651 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2001). 
 
 